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1. SCOPE OF THE PAPER  
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Purpose of this paper is analyzing a topic already widely addressed by the 
jurisprudence and the scholars: which impact may really have EU law, and, especially, its 
jurisprudence, in the evolution, in Italy and in the Italian jurisprudence, of the self-
annulment (in other terms, annulment ex officio, by the same Administration which has 
released the act
2
) of administrative acts not in line with EU law
3
. 
                                                 
2 On the self-annulment of administrative acts under Italian administrative law, see, in the international literature, 
in general terms, RAMAJOLI, Administrative Internal Review, annual report, 2011, Italy, in Jus Publicum Network 
Review, and, with specific attention to the influence of EU law, ELIANTONIO, The Enforcement of EC Rights 
Against National Authorities and the Influence of Koebler and Kuehne & Heitz on Italian Administrative Law: 
Opening Pandora's Box?, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2006/4. 
3On the this topic, many contributions have been offered by the legal scholars. 
Among others, ARDITO, Autotutela, affidamento e concorrenza nella giurisprudenza comunitaria, in Dir. amm., 
2008, 631; especially. 662; BECKER, Application of Community Law by Member States' Public Authorities: 
between Autonomy and Effectiveness, in Comm. Market Law Rev. 2007, 44, 1035.;  CARANTA, Comment to Case 
C-453/00, Kuhne & Heinz NV v. Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2005, 42, 
179; CARINGELLA, Affidamento e autotutela: la strana coppia, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com.,2008, 425; CHITI, Diritto 
amministrativo europeo, Milano, 2008, 572; CONTALDI, Atti amministrativi contrastanti con il diritto comunitario, 
in Dir. Un. Eur., 2007, 747; D’ANCONA, Interesse pubblico, discrezionalità amministrativa e istanza di parte 
nell’annullamento d’ufficio: riflessioni su recenti sviluppi dottrinari e giurisprudenziali fra diritto interno e diritto 
comunitario, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 2009, 574.; DEL SIGNORE, Il ruolo della Pubblica Amministrazione 
nazionale ai fini dell'effettività del diritto comunitario, in Riv. it. dir.  pubbl. com., 2009, 442.; DE LUCA, 
Sull’obbligo di riesame delle decisioni amministrative contrarie al diritto comunitario”, in www.giustamm.it.; DE 
PRETIS, «Illegittimità comunitaria » dell'atto amministrativo definitivo, certezza del diritto e potere di riesame, in 
Giorn. dir. amm., 2004, 723; FERRARI, Annullamento in autotutela di provvedimenti contrastanti con il diritto 
comunitario, in Giur. It., 2008, 1286.; GALETTA, Autotutela decisoria e diritto comunitario, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. 
com., 2005, 35; GALETTA, I procedimenti di riesame, in La disciplina generale dell'azione amministrativa: saggi 
ordinati in sistema, edited by CERULLI IRELLI, Napoli, 2006, 393, 398; GAROFOLI, Concessione di lavori: 
discrezionalità del potere di annullamento d’ufficio e vincoli comunitari, in Urb. e app., 1998, 1343; GATTINARA, 
Il ruolo comunitario delle amministrazioni nazionali alla luce della sentenza Kuhne & Heitz, in Dir. com. scambi 
internaz., 2004, 489; GIOVAGNOLI, L’atto amministrativo in contrasto con il diritto comunitario: il regime 
giuridico e il problema dell’autotutela decisoria, in www.giustamm.it; GRECO, Illegittimità comunitaria e pari 
dignità degli ordinamenti, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 2008, 505; GRECO, Il potere amministrativo nella (più 
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This legal issue has been largely debated. Still, it remains substantially unsettled. 
We will try to elaborate certain answers, also in the light of the recent reform of art. 97 of 
Constitution
4.
 
 
2. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE: PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY AND PRINCIPLE OF 
EQUIVALENCY  
European jurisprudence, although probably still in progress and so susceptible of 
stronger developments, shows, so far, a certain degree of prudence. 
It is manifest and declared, in fact, the attention with which the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) (sometimes in contrast with the opinions of General Advocates
5
) avoids to 
                                                                                                                            
recente) giurisprudenza del giudice comunitario, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 2009, 819; GRUNER, L'annullamento 
d'ufficio in bilico tra i principi di preminenza e di effettività del diritto comunitario, da un lato, ed i principi della 
certezza dl diritto e dell'autonomia procedurale degli Stati membri, dall'altro, in Dir. Proc. Amm., 2007, 235 ss.; 
PIGNATELLI, L’illegittimità “comunitaria” dell’atto amministrativo, in Giur. cost., 2008, 3635.; RAIMONDI, Atti 
nazionali inoppugnabili e diritto comunitario tra principio di effettività e competenze di attribuzione, in Dir. Un. 
Eur., 2008, 773; TABOROWSKY, Comment to Joined cases C-392/04 & C-422/04, i-21 Germany GmbH (C-
392/04), Arcor AG & Co. KG (C-422/04), formerly ISIS Multimedia Net GmbH & Co. KG v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, in Comm. Market Law Rev., 2007, 44, 1463; VALAGUZZA, La concretizzazione dell'interesse 
pubblico nella recente giurisprudenza amministrativa in tema di annullamento d'ufficio, in Dir. Proc. Amm, 2004, 
1245; VILLATA - RAMAJOLI, Il provvedimento amministrativo, Torino, 2006, 560. 
4 Constitutional Law 20 April 2012, no. 1, which introduced a new par. 1 in art. 97 of Constitution, according to 
which «Public Administrations, in coherence with European Union law sistem, shall ensure an equilibrated 
balance-sheet and the sustainability of public debt» (« Le pubbliche amministrazioni, in coerenza con 
l'ordinamento dell'Unione europea, assicurano l'equilibrio dei bilanci e  la sostenibilita' del debito pubblico»). 
5 See for example Opinion of Advocate General Lèger released on the 17 June 2003, case C-453/00, Kuhne & 
Heitz: « The principles of direct applicability and the primacy of Community law, and also the provisions of 
Article 10 EC, preclude a national administrative body from refusing an individual's claim for payment based on 
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invade (except in very particular and marginal cases
6
) the field of procedural and judicial 
autonomy of member states. 
The interest of full effectiveness of EU law is, in other terms, limited by the 
procedural choices that the member states lawfully may oppose to compulsory (i.e., not 
discretional) self-annulments and to the absence of time-limits for the exercise of the power 
of self-annulment. These limitations may find an explanation essentially in the need of 
safeguarding the principle of legal certainty (so to avoid that «administrative acts which 
produce legal effects» are «called into question indefinitely»
7
), and, at the same time, in the 
protection of the legitimate reliance of the recipient of the act (wherever the act is beneficial 
for the recipient).  
For sake of completeness, the position so manifested by the EU judges does not 
impose any time limits or substantive limits to the self-annulment. It simply legitimates 
possible national choices to establish terms and guarantees, if and to the extent that the 
                                                                                                                            
Community law on the ground that the claim seeks to call into question a prior administrative decision which has 
become final, following the dismissal of an action for the annulment of the decision by a decision which has the 
legal authority of a final judgment, although that final decision is based on an interpretation of Community law 
which was invalidated by the Court in a subsequent preliminary ruling ».  
6 See the judgment of the ECJ, 13 January  2004, case C-453/00, Kuhne & Heitz, in which the obligation of 
internal review of administrative acts is made subject to four stringent conditions: « The principle of cooperation 
arising from Article 10 EC imposes on an administrative body an obligation to review a final administrative 
decision, where an application for such review is made to it, in order to take account of the interpretation of the 
relevant provision given in the meantime by the Court where  -    under national law, it has the power to reopen 
that decision; the administrative decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of a national court 
ruling at final instance; that judgment is, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a 
misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC; and -    the person concerned complained to the 
administrative body immediately after becoming aware of that decision of the Court. ». 
7ECJ, 19 September  2006, C-392/04 e C-422/04, i-21 Germany GmbH e Arcor, point 51. 
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latter are reasonable
8
. This position seems consistent with the one about revocation of EU 
unlawful administrative acts: enjoying a presumption of validity (as, in the EU judges view, 
also the national administrative acts), EU administrative acts create a legitimate reliance on 
the recipients, and thus are revocable exclusively without unreasonable and disproportional 
sacrifices for the recipient
9
. 
Equally clear is, on the other side, in relation to self-annulment, the request, from 
EU law, of an equivalent regime between the safeguard offered to EU legality and, 
respectively, to the national one. 
In few words, where and to the extent that, in a given legal system, self-annulment 
of administrative acts is mandatory as a result of violations of domestic law, equally 
mandatory should be, at the same conditions, the self-annulment for violation of EU law: 
«It must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the absence of relevant 
Community rules, the detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the protection of the 
                                                 
8See in particular, ECJ, grand chamber, 12 February 2008, case C-2/06,Willy Kempter KG: «Community law does 
not impose any limit in time for making an application for review of an administrative decision that has become 
final. The Member States nevertheless remain free to set reasonable time-limits for seeking remedies, in a manner 
consistent with the Community principles of effectiveness and equivalence ». 
9 See for example ECJ, 26 February 1987, case C-15/85, Cons. Coop. D’Abruzzo c. Commissione,  point 10: « 
under Community law, as under the national laws of the various Member States, an administrative measure, even 
though it may be irregular, is presumed to be valid until it has been properly repealed or withdrawn by the 
institution which adopted it ». 
Among the scholars, for a comparative research, CORLETTO, Provvedimenti di secondo grado e tutela 
dell’affidamento, in I procedimenti di secondo grado e tutela dell’affidamento in Europa, edited by CORLETTO, 
Padova, 2007, 1. 
On the principle of so called “vertical equivalency”, i.e. on the fact that it seems disputable the request, from EU 
side, of a stricter regime of self-annulment in relation to domestic administrative acts than in relation to EU 
administrative acts, see GRECO, Illegittimità, and, fully in line with the former, DEL SIGNORE, op. cit. 
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rights which individuals acquire under Community law are a matter for the domestic legal 
order of each Member State, under the principle of the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order 
(principle of effectiveness) »
10
. This with the consequence that « in relation to the principle 
of equivalence, this requires that all the rules applicable to appeals, including the prescribed 
time-limits, apply without distinction to appeals on the ground of infringement of 
Community law and to appeals on the ground of disregard of national law. It follows that, if 
the national rules applicable to appeals impose an obligation to withdraw an administrative 
act that is unlawful under domestic law, even though that act has become final, where to 
uphold that act would be ‘downright intolerable’, the same obligation to withdraw must 
exist under equivalent conditions in the case of an administrative act which does not 
comply with Community law»
11
. 
 
3. THE ITALIAN JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE 
UNDERESTIMATION OF PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY TO THE 
UNDERESTIMATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCY  
 The Council of State has already expressed its opinion on the possible peculiarity, 
and, in particular, compulsory character, of the self-annulment of administrative acts for EU 
violations. 
Two positions in the sense of a reinforced regime for the safeguard of the EU 
legality seem specifically identifiable. 
                                                 
10ECJ, 19 September 2006, point 57. 
11 ECJ, 19 September 2006, points 62-63. 
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According to the first one, the administrative act in violation of EU law should 
always be self-annulled, on the basis of the supremacy and primacy of EU law on national 
law.  The contrast with EU law would be «sufficient to create a concrete and current public 
interest and to exclude that a the private interest to preserve the act may prevail»
12
. In fact, 
«in the light of the necessity to fulfill EU obligations, any other interests, either public or 
private, may be sacrificed », also because, in relation to «acts or orders released in 
application of a norm to be disapplied», it should be declared «their annulment in 
consideration of the recognized ineffectiveness of the legal provisions on which they were 
based»
13
. In sum, «the administrative consequences » of the disapplication would represent 
a «fulfillment of an international obligation of the State…such to justify the sacrifice of any 
other interests, either public or private»
14
. 
In reality, such jurisprudence (that dates back to the 90s of the XX century) seems 
based on an extreme view of the EU law supremacy, deemed as such to directly affect the 
stability of administrative acts in violation of EU law (in terms of either their 
disapplication, or their compulsory self-annulment). This perspective, that appears in a way 
consistent with (although not necessarily descendent from) the regime of the normative 
acts
15
 in contrast with EU law has been nonetheless rejected (after a first, apparent, support 
offered by the Ciola case in 1999
16
) by the same European Court of Justice. The European 
                                                 
12Council of State, IV, 5 June 1998, n. 918, in Urb. e app., 1998, 1343 ss. 
13Council of State, IV, 18 Jannuary 1996, n. 54, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. com., 1997, 177 
14Council of State, 54/1996, cit. 
15 Among them, administrative regulations, that according to domestic law, are still administrative acts. 
16 ECJ, 29 April 1999, case C-224/97, Ciola: «A prohibition which is contrary to the freedom to provide services, 
laid down before the accession of a Member State to the European Union not by a general abstract rule but by a 
specific individual administrative decision that has become final, must be disregarded when assessing the validity 
of a fine imposed for failure to comply with that prohibition after the date of accession ». 
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Court has not only clarified the full acceptability of the preclusion to appeal  administrative 
acts, once expired the time-limit to appeal, but, above all, in the already mentioned 
jurisprudence on self-annulments or revocations, has recognized great importance to 
principles like the procedural autonomy and the certainty of law, that, in its opinion, shall 
prevail, in relation to the self-annulment of administrative acts, on EU law supremacy.  
According to the second position, the compulsory character of self-annulment is 
grounded on more traditional arguments: it is not per se the EU law supremacy such to 
justify the removal of the act in violation of EU law; but, more indirectly, this compulsory 
character of the self-annulment descends from the negative consequences for the State 
triggered by the failure to fulfill the EU obligations. In fact, such failure may eventually 
result in a fine (pursuant to art. art. 260, par. TFUE
17
). Thus, based on the traditional idea of 
the compulsory character of the self-annulment of administrative acts that risk to create 
(and not necessarily directly create) economic losses for the administration, the self-
annulment is necessary and compulsory (as opposed to being just admissible, to the extent 
that all other preconditions of public interests exist; in other words, as opposed to be a 
discretional decision). In this connection, for example, the Council of State noted  that «the 
public interest, very evident, consists not in the simple restoration of the violated legal 
order, but in the purpose of avoiding a future condemnation, and, meanwhile, the 
diminution of prestige for our country abroad, resulting from the well-founded accusation 
of having breached the treaty»
18
. 
                                                 
17 « If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply 
with the judgment of the Court, it may bring the case before the Court after giving that State the opportunity to 
submit its observations. It shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member 
State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court finds that the Member State 
concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it. ». 
Previously, an equivalent provision was laid down by art. 228, par. 1, of the EU Treaty. 
18Council of State, V, 18 April 1996, n. 447. 
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These two positions seem, therefore, partially similar, as both based on the 
awareness of the specific compulsory character of the EU obligations and the seriousness of 
the relative sanctions (to be applied to the State). However, the first position seems to have 
overestimated the current stage of evolution of EU law, as clearly emerging, now, from the 
ECJ jurisprudence. The second position starts from an objective fact (the EU sanctions 
against the State), to derive from them well known consequences, as descending from 
national law (the necessity of avoiding economic losses for the State, by exercising of the 
power of self-annulment). In such a way, it seems more in line with the current EU law 
jurisprudence on internal review of administrative acts, that, as noted, seems based on the 
principle of equivalency (rather than on the principle of supremacy of EU law).    
More recently, the administrative jurisprudence has, on the contrary, demonstrated 
a clear refusal of recognizing any peculiarity to the self-annulment of administrative acts in 
breach of EU law. In fact, the self-annulment should be «deemed subject, also in these 
cases, to the general principles governing the lawfulness of the relative acts, i.e. the 
simultaneous presence of preeminent reasons of public interest to remove the act»
19
. In 
other terms, the «principle of consolidation of acts not appealed and of the compulsory 
character of the self-annulment» would not be derogated where a violation of EU law is 
claimed as a reason of unlawfulness»
20
. This line of jurisprudence additionally observes 
that «Even in the EU legal system, the mere unlawfulness of the administrative act is not a 
sufficient element to justify the removal of the act by the Administration, as being 
necessary a careful balancing of the other involved interests, including that of the recipient 
who relied on the unlawful act»
21
. As we will immediately see, in such a way, there has 
                                                 
19Council of State, V, 8 September 2008, no. 4263. 
20In the same exact terms,, Regional Administrative Court of Veneto, I, 28 February 2008, no. 493. 
21Council of State, VI, 22 November 2006, no. 6831.  
In the same sense, Council of State, VI, 3 March 2006, no. 1023 and Administrative Court of Appeal for Sicily, 21 
April 2010, no. 553. 
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been a shift between two equally unbalanced positions: from a probably too enthusiastic 
view, by which the supremacy of EU law has been overestimated (without recognizing 
adequate significance to the procedural autonomy), to a view that, by contrast, 
underestimate the principle of equivalency.  
 
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCY AND THE FINANCIAL 
BURDEN DESCENDING FROM FAILURE TO FULFILL EU 
OBLIGATIONS: ART. 1, PAR. 136, OF LAW NO. 311 OF 2004 (AND ITS 
INTERPRETATION) AND ART. 16 BIS OF LAW NO. 11 OF 2005  
According to a by now traditional line of jurisprudence of the Council of State, in 
particular inaugurated by the judgment Fiori of 1976
22
 (in which it was mentioned the 
existence of a « in re ipsa public interest to self-annul… », wherever «the enforcement of 
the administrative act would have caused current or future expenditures  of public money, 
whose lawfulness appear disputable»), the concrete and current interest to annul an act 
which entails an unlawful payment, even future, of public money is in re ipsa, in the sense 
that it does not require any justification). In other terms, it is sufficient to mention as a 
reason of in the self-annulment the circumstance of the possible expenditures of public 
money, to justify the annulment, without any further need of giving reasons addressing the 
other involved interests.. 
It could be discussed whether such line of jurisprudence may, per se, justify the 
application of the principle of equivalence to the issue of the self-annulment of 
administrative acts in breach of EU law.  
                                                 
22 2 March 1976, no. 124, in Cons. St., 1976, I, 373 ss.. 
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In particular, one could doubt about such application based on two considerations: 
at first because we are talking about a line of jurisprudence, that, as such, may always 
mutate; secondly, because this doctrine presents certain intrinsic limits, as being developed 
in very specific cases essentially related to the career moves of civil servants: such moves 
are directly (and not only possibly) such to produce an expenditure of public money (as a 
result of the increased salary). On the contrary, administrative acts in violation of EU law, 
ordinarily, create only a possibility of financial exposure for the State, excepts where the 
failure to comply with EU law has been already ascertained by the ECJ. 
However, in reality, not only jurisprudential positions may be mentioned in 
national law.  
In 2004, a new legislative intervention took place, perhaps suggested by a 2000 
ruling of the Constitutional Court, according to which the discretionality of the 
Administration in the field of self-annulment can well be consumed by the legislator, as 
such discretionality does not enjoy any constitutional coverage, but, on the contrary, the 
self-annulment represents «a corollary of the principle of legality, that is intended, among 
other purposes, to avoid the consolidation of situations contra legem»
23
. In particular, art. 1, 
co. 136, of law no. 311 del 2004, states that «with the purpose of realizing savings or 
avoiding financial costs for public administrations, the self-annulment of unlawful 
administrative acts can always been decided, even if the act is under enforcement». The 
second paragraph makes it clear that this type of self-annulment «in relation to 
administrative acts affecting contractual or conventional relationships with private parties, 
shall keep harmless the private parties from the possible deriving economic prejudices, and, 
                                                 
23Constitutional Court, 22 March 2000, no. 75, in Giur. cost., 2000, 810, with comment by SCOCA, Una ipotesi di 
autotutela amministrativa impropria. 
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in any case, shall not be decided more than three years later from the entrance in force of 
the administrative act, even where the relative enforcement is still in progress »
24
. 
As well emerging form the legislative wording, this provision is not only of a 
general nature, but, most f all, does not distinguish between acts that just hypothetically 
might create economic burdens, and, respectively, the ones that, directly and immediately, 
create such burdens. Put it in a different way, no distinction is established between acts that 
generically might produce economic consequences, and, respectively, acts that certainly (as 
a result of their unlawfulness) such consequences are due to produce. 
The jurisprudence has sometimes offered an interpretation of this legal provision 
restrictive, if not abrogative. For example, in 2009, the Council of State held that «with 
respect to the provisions of art. 1, par. 136, law no. 311 of 2004 (Budget law for 2005) 
….they are intended to restrict the so called consolidation of subjective positions of the 
citizen deriving from unlawful administrative acts, allowing the self-annulment regardless 
the time-period passed from the releasing of the act, but, as made it manifest by the use of 
the term “can” preceding the attribution of the power of deciding the self-annulment, it does 
not remove the very discretionary nature of this power, whose exercise cannot be claimed 
by the recipient of the act or by a third interested party »
25
. 
This reading - probably explainable in relation to the fear that public 
administrations are overflowed by requests of, allegedly compulsory, self-annulments - 
does not seem persuasive. On the contrary, the use of the term «can» seems simply 
intended to indicate that a certain administrative power has been conferred. Such a power 
(and this represents a real novelty) is not conditioned (unlike it normally happens) to the 
                                                 
24On this legal provision, see GIOVAGNOLI Autotutela e risparmio di spesa nella finanziaria 2005, in Urb. App., 
2005, 395 and CASSATELLA, La nuova disciplina dell'annullamento d'ufficio al vaglio della giurisprudenza 
amministrativa, in Foro amm. TAR 2006, 2186. 
25Council of State, VI,  18 September 2009,  no. 5621. 
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ascertainment of a public interest different from, and additional to, the safeguard of the 
lawfulness, wherever the Administration may face economic burdens as a result of this 
unlawfulness. This is confirmed by the fact that the term «always», cannot have, contrary to 
opinion of the Council of State, a merely temporal meaning: in the second part of the same 
paragraph, in applying to a specific case (administrative acts affecting contractual 
relationships) the same rule of the first part of the paragraph, a three years time-limit is 
introduced; this time-limit is logically incompatible with the use of the term «always» in a 
temporal meaning. As a result, the term «always» seem to be referred to preconditions of 
objective (as opposed to temporal) nature. In other words, the adverb «always» relates to 
whether it is necessary to take in count interests different from the one to save public 
money. 
The same Council of State, however, in 2010 seems to have construed the 2004 
legal provision differently, by expressly recognizing that «par. 136  has introduced the only 
case of self-annulment for in re ipsa reasons of public interest, with exclusion of any other 
case previously admitted by the jurisprudence, not connected with the savings of public 
money or the reduction of economic burdens for the Administration»
26
. Similarly, in 2012, 
the Administrative Court of Appeal for Sicily has defined the self-annulment at stake as 
characterized by the fact that a given public interest (the objective of saving public money) 
would ex lege prevail on any other public interests. This appears just as a different way to 
express the same concept: this type of self-annulment is not discretional, as exclusively 
based on a in re ipsa public interest
27
.  
If this reading of the legislative provisions is correct, and, if, as a result, Italian law 
system is to be interpreted in the sense that self-annulment of unlawful acts such to 
generically cause economic burdens for the Administration is compulsory, then the same 
                                                 
26 Council of State, V, 7 April 2010, no. 1946. 
27 Administrative Court of Appeals for Sicily, 1 February 2012, no. 110 
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rule should find application also in relation to administrative acts in violation of EU law. 
These latter, in fact, are always at risk to generate expenditures for the State, in relation 
both to EU  penalties and the request of compensation that the citizen could raise against 
the State, if directly affected by the violation of EU law). We can even conclude that, 
pursuant to the EU principle of equivalency, this application seems to emerge as imposed 
by the EU law.  
On the other side, it cannot be forgotten that a strict connection between violation 
of EU law and (sufficiently) probable – and in any case ex lege recognized as such and 
therefore per se material - economic burdens for the State and the other public bodies is by 
now clearly expressed by the legislative provisions at stake. In particular, it is exactly to 
avoid such economic burdens that, reflecting a provision originally (significantly) laid 
down by the Budget law for 2007
28
, art. 16 bis, par. 1, of law no. 11 of 2005 states that «in 
order to prevent the commencement of infringement procedure under art. 226 and following 
of the EC Treaty or to stop them, regions, autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, 
local authorities and other public bodies and subjects equivalent to them shall adopt any 
necessary measure to promptly correct any violation imputable to them of the obligations 
descending from EU law to member states. Such authorities are required to promptly 
comply with judgments released by the European Court of Justice, pursuant to art. 228, par. 
1, of the Treaty». The main sanction provided in case of violation of the mentioned par. 1, 
is, pursuant to the subsequent par. 4, a financial one: «the State can claim compensation 
vis-à-vis the subjects responsible of the violation to the obligations established by par. 1, in 
relation to the financial burdens descended by the condemnation judgments released by the 
European Court of Justice, pursuant to art. 228, par. 2, of EC Treaty». 
An hypothetical interpretation according to which such legislative intervention 
would not require a compulsory self-annulment of administrative acts in breach of EU law 
(or in contrast with the European Convention of human rights, as art. 16 bis , par. 5 
                                                 
28 Art. 1, pars. 1216-1219, of law. no. 296 of 2006. 
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mentions also the economic burdens descending from judgments of the European Court of 
human rights) and so such to expose the State to financial penalties would mean not only 
assuming a position inconsistent with the traditional doctrine, as we have seen codified in 
2004, according to which the self-annulment intended to prevent economic burdens for the 
State is compulsory (with the consequence of violating the EU principle of equivalency). It 
would also imply a refusal to recognize any effective significance (and content) to the duty 
- clearly and even emphatically expressed by the legislative provisions - of adopting «any 
measure necessary to promptly correct any violation of the obligations descending to the 
member states from EU law…». 
This point has been well understood by a 2007 judgment of the Regional 
Administrative Court of Sicily, which has recalled, based on the mentioned law provisions, 
that a self-annulment of administrative acts in violation of EU law, would be compulsory 
not just generically «in force of the obligations of cooperation pursuant to art. 10 EC 
Treaty», but also «in relation to the need of avoiding that administrative action in violation 
of EC law affects from a financial standpoint local communities, as a result of the possible 
compensation action brought by the State, as responsible entity, according to the 
international law, of the failure to fulfill EC obligations, pursuant to art. 1, par. 1215, of law 
no. 296 of 2006»
29
.  
 
5. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF ART. 97 OF 
CONSTITUTION  
Constitutional Law 20 April 2012, no. 1, just introduced a new par. 1 in art. 97 of 
Constitution, according to which «Public Administrations, in coherence with the EU law 
system, ensure an equilibrated balance sheet and the sustainability of public debt». 
                                                 
29Regional administrative Court of Sicily, Palermo, II, 28 September 2007, no. 2047. 
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Traditionally, art. 97 has represented probably the most important constitutional 
parameter for all the administrative action. In fact, the main principles governing the 
organization and the action of the public administrations have been identified and 
developed by the jurisprudence and the legal scholars on the basis of, and in relation to, art. 
97.  
The circumstance that, as a result of the last constitutional reform, the first 
principle laid down by art. 97 is now represented by the need of avoiding unjustified 
expenditures of public money is likely to influence the topic of self-annulment of 
administrative acts. The traditional position according to which the self-annulment may be 
compulsory, wherever intended to prevent unlawful costs for the Administration, seems in 
fact clearly reinforced. No need to say that, in this connection, also the opinion expressed in 
this article about the specific compulsoriness of the acts in violation of EU law should be 
equally strengthened. This conclusion may find support also in the specific wording of the 
new art. 97, par. 1, that expressly mentions the obligation of acting in «coherence with the 
EU law system». In other words, a specific connection between EU obligations and the 
financial interest of the State and so the sustainability of the public debt may even be said 
to be directly suggested by the constitutional provision at stake. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In conclusion, art. 1, par. 136, of law no. 311 of 2004, especially in the light of art. 
16 bis, of law no. 11 of 2005 and, most o all, of the just passed constitutional reform of art. 
97 of Constitution, opens the way (from a domestic, as well as EU law, perspectives) for a 
compulsory self-annulment of administrative acts, in violation of EU law. The same can be 
said in relation to administrative acts in violation of the European convention of human 
rights (although exclusively from a domestic law standpoint, not be applicable, in this case, 
any principle correspondent to the EU one of equivalency). 
This conclusion is not directly and mostly imposed only by the EU law. It is not, in 
other terms, an external imposition, such to put in discussion basic principles of the 
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domestic administrative law. Rather, it is a matter of consistent application of domestic 
legislative choices, from which all the due consequences are to be derived, in harmony with  
the principle (this one a really EU one) of equivalency. 
Obviously, legislative choices, once fully appreciated as to all their consequences, 
may also appear disproportional and to be better balanced: for example, it is easy to 
appreciate the difference among an act (or a contract
30
) already definitively recognized as 
unlawful by the EU authorities (and so to be annulled, in order to avoid almost certain 
financial consequences for the State) and, respectively, a possible reason of unlawfulness 
that, just hypothetically, might be ascertained by EU authorities, and, eventually, trigger a 
fine.  
                                                 
30 See  ECJ, 18 July 2007, case C-503/04, Commissione c. Germania, in Riv. it. dir. publ. com., 2009, 431 ss., with 
a dissenting comment by GRECO, Superprimato del diritto europeo: le direttive sui mezzi di ricorso vincolano 
tutti, ma non la Commissione e la Corte di giustizia, and in Dir. Proc. Amm., 2009, 112 ss. with comment by 
GOISIS, Ordinamento comunitario e sorte del contratto, una volta annullata l’aggiudicazione. According to the 
judgment (point 29), « The adverse effect on the freedom to provide services arising from the disregard of the 
provisions of Directive 92/50 subsists throughout the entire performance of the contracts concluded in breach 
thereof (Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany, paragraph 36). Furthermore, at that date, the 
failure to fulfill obligations was to continue for decades, given the long period for which the contract in question 
had been concluded. ». 
Lastly, consistent with the principle established by ECJ, 18 July 2007, ECJ, 21 December 2011, C-465/10, point 
57: « In respect of such a breach of the tendering rules laid down by Directive 92/50, which was adopted in order 
to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide services and to protect the interests of traders established in a 
Member State who wish to offer services to contracting authorities established in another Member State (see, in 
particular, Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction [2001] ECR I-7725, paragraph 32), it should be recalled that the 
adverse effect on the freedom to provide services arising from the infringement of Directive 92/50 must be found 
to subsist throughout the entire performance of the contracts concluded in breach of the directive (see Joined Cases 
C-20/01 and C-28/01 Commission v Germany [2003] ECR I-3609, paragraph 36, and Case C-503/04 Commission 
v Germany [2007] ECR I-6153, paragraph 29).». 
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However, given, from one side, the attention for the safeguard of public finances 
in administrative action that, with increasing intensity, emerges from the domestic 
legislation and now, expressly, even from art. 97, par. 1, of Constitution, and, from the 
other side, the special consideration for the respect of EU obligations that is manifested by 
the Constitution in relation to both the legislative activity (art. 117, par. 1
31
) and the 
administrative one (art. 120, par. 2
32
), a compulsory nature in a strict an proper sense for the 
self-annulment of administrative acts in breach of EU law frankly does not appear an 
unreasonable conclusion. 
 
                                                 
31 «The legislative powers are exercised by the State and the Regions in compliance with the obligations 
descending from EC law and the International law». 
32 According to which the Government is empowered to exercise substitutive administrative powers against the 
Regions and the Local Authorities, among other reasons, in case of violation of European law. 
